Applying International Human Rights Standards to National Curricula: Insights From Literature Education at Jewish and Arab High Schools
Lotem Perry-Hazan, University of Haifa
Shulamit Almog, University of Haifa
Nohad A’li, Western Galilee Academic College and the University of Haifa

The paper presents an innovative way of exploring curricula by using a legal framework, based on one feature of the right to education in international human rights law – the adaptability of education to children’s circles of cultural affiliations. It examines the ways in which the right to adaptable education is realized by high school literature curricula designed for the Jewish and Arabic sectors of the Israeli National-Education Stream. The methodology used is two-layered: First, elements of adaptability in each of the texts are traced, and then a critical examination of aspects of adaptability in the curriculum is conducted. The main findings indicate that the curriculum designed for Jewish students is much more adaptable than the curriculum designed for Arabic students. The conclusions specify the importance of practices that contribute to the realization of the right to adaptable education: allowing wide choice between a variety of options, performing constant updates, designing a canonical corpus, referring to constitutive historical events, and exposing all pupils to the culture of other groups. These conclusions do not presume that curricula should be subjected to legal scrutiny. They offer, however, an additional tool that could help in the complicated process of shaping education policy.

Ill-Suited to the Digital Age: Problems with the Emerging Judicial Perspectives on Warrantless Searches of Cell Site Location Information
Christopher D. Browne, Northeastern University School of Law

For the average user, a cell phone represents a form of communications technology. For a rapidly increasing number of law enforcement officials, a cell phone functions as a tracking device, used to monitor the location of persons of interest on a minute-by-minute basis. This new surveillance capability has evolved largely without public notice, and unfortunately without judicial oversight in many cases. A plurality among Federal and State courts that have addressed the practice of tracking cell phone users through the signal of their phones has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not require a search warrant for this type of surveillance. Those courts have reasoned that because no expectation of privacy exists in an individual’s public location, no warrant is required to track that information through surveillance technology. This article critiques that plurality view. The history of the Fourth Amendment’s relationship to surveillance technology suggests that the Supreme Court did not intend to permit widespread surveillance of American citizens without any judicial oversight. Furthermore, the plurality view draws an unmanageable distinction between monitoring public and private locations; at the time law enforcement officers use surveillance technology to determine a citizens’ location, they have no way to know if it will be in a public or private area. Consequently, the plurality view incentivizes rather than deters, surveillance that might encroach on historically private locations such as the home. Finally pervasive surveillance of American citizens has a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional liberties.